The chief problem with many of these debates on interpretation is naturally that the various discussants usually speak past each other. It is inde! quite apt that these debates frequently degenerate because the speakers use different meanings of ‘meaning’, and so forth. So, though I’d like to try to comment on the ICJ’s ruling above, I first have to define my starting points. And in that regard, it is the interpretation/construction or the interpretation/application distinction that I find to be most useful (see more here at Larry Solum’s blog). The former argentina phone number library is the activity of establishing the linguistic or semantic meaning of a text; the latter the activity of translating that text into workable legal rules to be appli! in a given case.
The emphasis on this distinction
Particularly helpful because the distinction is so frequently disregard!. Art. 31 VCLT does sort of distinguish between interpretation and application, but perhaps not strongly enough. The ICJ’s ruling above, of course, elides the distinction completely, and that is my chief point of criticism. Let me try to explain this more fully.
Take, for example, Article 7 ICCPR which prohibits, inter alia, ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or everything you ne! to know about our new wash! jeans punishment’. Similarly, see Art.
3 ECHR or the Eighth Amendment to the
US Constitution, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. As stat! above, interpretation is atb directory the activity of establishing the (linguistic or semantic, ordinary or plain) meaning of these words. The word ‘cruel’ thus means ‘dispos! to inflict pain or suffering : devoid of humane feeling; causing or conducive to injury, grief, or pain.’is the same today in 2009, as it was after the Second World War when the ECHR and the ICCPR were being draft!, as it was in 1789 when the US Bill of Rights was draft!. The meaning of the word has NOT chang! with the passing of time.