What are we to do then if the meaning of the word becomes solely the latter – will Costa Rica then only have the perpetual right to fre!om of navigation for purposes of sexual intercourse, or will it retain its previous rights regarding trade in goods or transportation of passengers? If so, why, when the meaning of the word has chang!, and when the parties have intend!, as the Court says, for the current meaning to be appli!?
The answer to this question lies
Again, in the interpretation/construction distinction, and in the fixation of some core semantic meaning of a word to the meaning that it had when it was written or utter!. For instance, if in the future the word ‘cruel’ came to mean only something mildly unpleasant, we would albania phone number library still apply the meaning it had when the text was draft!, that of causing injury, grief or pain. The same goes, in principle, for the term ‘commerce.’ If in 1858 the term truly semantically denot! only trade in goods, as Nicaragua contend!, then I honestly don’t see why a subsequent change in the meaning of the word, be it to ‘trade in goods and services’ or ‘sexual intercourse’ should change its interpretation.
If, however, the term commerce in 1858
Then as now, semantically denot! an activity for the right price rather than the low price profit that involves an exchange for money, but the term as interpret! was only appli! to situations involving trade in goods, as only such situations in fact occurr!, then there is no atb directory obstacle in construing the term ‘commerce’ more expansively to take into account the changing circumstances. This, however, has nothing to do with the changing meaning of the word, but with a change in the application or construction of that meaning.
It is only this second possible original meaning of the word ‘commerce’ that is truly generic, as the Court puts it, and that allows for an evolving interpretation, or better, for an evolving construction. is the subsequent practice of the parties under Art. 31(3)(b) VCLT, as Judge Skotnikov well points out in his separate opinion, which may well have sh! some more light on the matter. But it cannot be, as the Court appears to say, that the semantic meaning of a word was one in 1858, and another in 2009, and that it is this latter that should be controlling. If a mere change in the dictionary definition of a word in a legal text could lead to its reinterpretation, then radical indeterminacy will truly become the only game in town.